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[Forthcoming in The Journal of Philosophy.]
The Dierence Principle Would Not Be Chosen
behind the Veil of Ignorance∗
Johan E. Gustafsson†
John Rawls argues that the Dierence Principle (also known as theMax-
imin Equity Criterion) would be chosen by parties trying to advance
their individual interests behind the Veil of Ignorance. Behind this veil,
the parties do not know who they are and they are unable to assign or
estimate probabilities to their turning out to be any particular person in
society. Much discussion of Rawls’s argument concerns whether he can
plausibly rule out the parties’ having access to probabilities about who
they are. Nevertheless, I argue that, even if the parties lacked access to
probabilities about who they are in society, they would still reject the
Dierence Principle. I argue that there are cases where it is still clear
to the parties that it is not in any of their individual interests that the
Dierence Principle be adopted.
What, if anything, could justify a principle of social justice? One answer,
from the political thought of the Enlightenment, is a social contract.
According to Social Contract Theory, a principle of justice is justied
if and only if it would be agreed to by parties trying to advance their
individual interests in a certain initial situation.
In John Rawls’s version of Social Contract Theory, this initial situation
is the Original Position—an initial situation where the parties are situated
behind a Veil of Ignorance. Behind this veil, the parties do not know who
they are and they are unable to assign or estimate probabilities to their
turning out to be any particular person in society.1 Rawls argues that,
∗ I wish to thank Krister Bykvist, Stephen Holland, Christopher Jay, Mary Leng,
MartinO’Neill,Martin Peterson, Christian Piller,WlodekRabinowicz, andAlanThomas
for valuable comments.
† I would be grateful for any thoughts or comments on this paper, which can be sent
to me at johan.eric.gustafsson@gmail.com.
1 Rawls,A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard, 1971), pp. 136–42, and (Cambridge:
Harvard, 1999), pp. 118–23.Hereinaer referred to as TJ. See also Rawls, Justice as Fairness:
ARestatement, ed. ErinKelly (Cambridge:Harvard, 2001), pp. 85–89.Hereinaer referred
to as JF. A thinner veil, behind which one has an equal probability of turning out to be
anyone, is introduced in William Vickrey, “Measuring Marginal Utility by Reactions to
Risk,” Econometrica xiii, 4 (October 1945): 319–33, at p. 329.
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behind the Veil of Ignorance, the parties would choose the Dierence
Principle (also known as the Maximin Equity Criterion).2
Much discussion of Rawls’s argument concerns whether he can plau-
sibly rule out the parties’ having access to probabilities about who they
are.3 If the parties assign an equal probability to their turning out to be
anyone in society, they would realize that they maximize their expected
well-being if they agree to the Principle of Average Utility, rather than the
Dierence Principle.4
In this paper, I shall argue that, even if the parties lacked access to
probabilities about who they are in society, they would still reject the
Dierence Principle. I shall argue that—even without assigning or esti-
mating probabilities to their turning out to be any particular person in
society—there are still cases where it is clear to the parties that it is not in
their individual interests that the Dierence Principle be adopted. Hence,
behind the Veil of Ignorance, the parties would not choose the Dierence
Principle.
* * *
Before we begin, however, we should clarify some terminology. Following
Rawls, we make a distinction between cases of risk, where there is an
objective basis for estimating probabilities, and cases of uncertainty, where
there is no such basis.5 Moreover, we distinguish the Dierence Principle
from the following principle for choice under uncertainty:
The Maximin Rule for Choice under Uncertainty
Let the value of a prospect be equal to the worst possible nal
outcome of the prospect. Choose a prospect with a maximal value
among all alternative prospects.6
2 TJ, (1971), pp. 118–92, (1999), pp. 102–67, and JF, pp. 80–134. Amartya K. Sen,
Collective Choice and Social Welfare (San Francisco: Holden-Day, 1970), pp. 137, 157,
provided the rst exact formulation of the Maximin Equity Criterion, based on some
remarks in Rawls, “Justice as Fairness,” this journal, liv, 22 (October 1957): 653–62,
at p. 656, and Rawls, “Distributive Justice,” in Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman, eds.,
Philosophy, Politics, and Society: Third Series, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967), pp. 58–82, at
pp. 61n2, 66.
3 See, for example, Thomas Nagel, “Rawls on Justice,” The Philosophical Review
lxxxii 2 (April 1973): 220–34, at pp. 229–30; Harsanyi, “Can the Maximin Principle
Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls’s Theory,” The American Political
Science Review lxix 2 (June 1975): 594–606, at pp. 598–600; and Derek Part, OnWhat
Matters, vol. 1, ed. Samuel Scheer (New York: Oxford, 2011), at pp. 350–51.
4 Harsanyi, “CardinalWelfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons
of Utility,” The Journal of Political Economy lxiii 4 (August 1955): 309–21, at p. 316.
5 JF, p. 106. A similar distinction is put forward in Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty,
and Prot, (Boston: Houghton Miin, 1921), pp. 19–20.
6 AbrahamWald, Statistical Decision Functions, (New York: Wiley, 1950), p. 18.
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Rawls rejects the implausible view that the Maximin Rule for Choice
under Uncertainty would be rational for choice under risk.7 And he does
not accept this principle as a general principle for rational decisions in all
cases of uncertainty.8 Crucially, Rawls does not require that the parties
rely on the Maximin Rule for Choice under Uncertainty in the Original
Position.9
1. The Ex-Post Dierence Principle
The Dierence Principle can be read in at least two very dierent ways,
depending on whether we evaluate social value ex post: with information
about how risky prospects turn out, or ex ante: without such information,
relying instead on expectations.10While Rawls favors an ex-ante version
of the Dierence Principle, we shall begin with the ex-post approach. On
this approach, the Dierence Principle amounts to the following:
The Ex-Post Dierence Principle
Let the social value of a nal outcome be equal to the minimum
well-being of any person in the outcome. And let the social value of
a prospect be equal to the expected social value of its nal outcome.
Choose a prospect with amaximal social value among all alternative
prospects.11
7 Rawls, “Some Reasons for the Maximin Criterion,” American Economic Review,
lxiv 2 (May 1974): 141–46, at p. 142, and JF, p. 97n19.
8 TJ (1971), p. 153, (1999), p. 133, and JF, pp. xxvii, 97n19.
9 JF, p. 99.
10 The ex-ante/ex-post distinction is due to Gunnar Myrdal,Monetary Equilibrium
(London: Hodge, 1939), p. 47.
11 This version of the Dierence Principle mirrors the maximin structure of the
Maximin Equity Criterion, according to which a rst distribution is socially at least
as good as a second distribution if and only if the worst o in the rst distribution
are at least as well o as the worst o in the second distribution. The Leximin Equity
Criterion, rst suggested by Sen (op. cit., p. 138n12), is just like the Maximin Equity
Criterion except in cases where the worst o in the distributions are equally well o.
In those cases, the Leximin Equity Criterion removes one of the worst o in both
distributions. Then, if the worst o among those who remain are better o in one of
the distributions, that distribution is socially better than the other. If not, repeat this
procedure again until one distribution comes out as socially better or all people who
remain are equally well o, in which case the distributions are socially equally good.
In TJ (1971), pp. 82–83, Rawls accepts the Leximin Equity Criterion, but—in TJ (1999),
p. 72—he claims that the dierences between the maximin and leximin criteria do
not matter in practice. Moreover, these dierences will not matter for the argument of
this paper. One noteworthy dierence, however, is that the Leximin Equity Criterion
evaluates nal outcomes in terms of a lexical ordering, and lexical orderings cannot
be represented by real-valued functions. Since the standard expected-utility approach
to calculating expectations requires an evaluation of nal outcomes represented by a
real-valued function, there is no straightforward way to dene an ex-post version of the
Leximin Equity Criterion.
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Note that, in Rawls’s theory, the Dierence Principle is subordinate to
the Principle of Justice (demanding equal basic liberties), the Principle
of Fair Equality of Opportunity (demanding public oces and social
positions to be open to all), and the Just Savings Principle (demanding
sucient savings for the future).12 For the purposes of our discussion,
we can ignore these complications. In the cases we shall discuss, assume
that all members of society have equal basic liberties and fair equality of
opportunity and that just savings have been made, so that the Dierence
Principle will apply.
In Rawls’s version of the Dierence Principle, the relevant compar-
isons for identifying the least advantaged are made in terms of primary
goods.13 For the sake of brevity, I shall make these comparisons in terms
of well-being. This is not a substantial change: the well-being levels can
represent indexes of primary goods.14
Finally, the Dierence Principle is only supposed to be applied to
the choice of the basic structure of society. The basic structure of society
is the way in which fundamental rights and duties are distributed by
major social institutions and the way these institutions determine the
distribution of advantages from social cooperation.15 Hence, in the cases
we shall discuss, the choices should be understood as choices determining
this basic structure.
To see how the Ex-Post Dierence Principle works, consider
Case 1
Alice Bob
5 1
1 5
2 2
1/2
1/2
A
B
Here, the box represents an initial choice node, where we have a choice
between two basic structures of society, A (chosen by going up in the
choice node) and B (chosen by going down). If A is chosen, we reach
a chance node, represented by the circle, where there is a one-in-two
probability that chance goes up, which would give Alice a well-being of 5
and Bob a well-being of 1, and a one-in-two probability that chance goes
down, which would give Alice a well-being of 1 and Bob a well-being of 5.
12 TJ (1971), pp. 302–3, (1999), pp. 266–67, and JF, p. 61.
13 TJ (1971), pp. 90–95, (1999), pp. 78–81.
14 Although I will assume for simplicity that expectations are calculated according to
expected utility theory,my argument does not rely on this assumption. Andmy argument
is not vulnerable to the possibility of diminishing marginal value. See appendix.
15 TJ (1971), p. 7, (1999), p. 6.
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If B is chosen, everyone is certain to get a well-being of 2. We suppose
that the probabilities in the chance node have an objective basis. And,
while we shall treat Alice and Bob as two individuals, they could also be
thought of as representatives from two complementary halves of society.
In this case, the Ex-Post Dierence Principle prescribes B, because, if
we choose A, the expected minimum well-being is 1 but, if we choose B,
the minimum well-being is 2, which is better. Choosing B, however, gives
everyone an expected well-being of 2, whereas choosing A gives everyone
an expected well-being of 3. Hence, in Case 1, the Ex-Post Dierence
Principle violates the following dominance principle:
The Weak Ex-Ante Pareto Principle
If each person has a higher expected well-being in prospect x than
in prospect y, then y is not chosen over x.16
In cases where a principle violates the Weak Ex-Ante Pareto Principle, the
parties know that, when the Veil of Ignorance has been lied, they would
(no matter who they turn out to be) prefer some alternative principle
16Marc Fleurbaey and Alex Voorhoeve put forward an argument against the Weak
Ex-Ante Pareto Principle in “Decide as YouWould with Full Information!: An Argument
againstExAntePareto,” inNir Eyal, SamiaHurst, Ole F. Norheim, andDanielWikler, eds.,
Inequalities in Health: Concepts, Measures, and Ethics (New York: Oxford), pp. 113–28, at
p. 114. Much the same argument can be found in Wlodek Rabinowicz “Prioritarianism
for Prospects,”Utilitas, xiv 1 (March 2002): 2–21, at p. 11. The argument is that the Weak
Ex-Ante Pareto Principle can violate
The Principle of Full Information
When one lacks information, but can infer that there is a particular alternative
one would invariably regard as best if one had full information, then one should
choose this alternative.
Note, however, that the Weak Ex-Ante Pareto Principle would only violate this require-
ment in combination with certain principles; it would not do so in combination with
some others. Combined with the Principle of Average Utility, for example, the Weak
Ex-Ante Pareto Principle would not violate the Principle of Full Information. So it is
not clear that the Weak Ex-Ante Pareto Principle would be to blame if the Principle
of Full Information were violated. In combination with the Dierence Principle, the
Principle of Full Information prescribes B in Case 1, contrary to theWeak Ex-Ante Pareto
Principle. But, as Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve (ibid., p. 117) point out, the Principle of Full
Information does not seem plausible given the role of the Veil of Ignorance. Fleurbaey
and Voorhoeve’s (ibid., p. 116) argument relies on an assumption about the agent being
“an egalitarian who rightly cares both about reducing outcome inequality and about
increasing individuals’ well-being.” In the Original Position, however, the parties are
supposed to try to advance their own individual interests; they are not supposed to be
concerned about egalitarianism. The principles of justice are what the parties, trying to
advance their own individual interests, would agree to; these principles are not what the
parties are supposed to be concerned with primarily—see TJ (1971), pp. 118–19, (1999),
pp. 102–3. Hence, for the parties in the Original Position, Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve’s
objection to the Weak Ex-Ante Pareto Principle could not get o the ground.
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which would give everyone a better expectation.17
In Case 1, Alice and Bob would each have a higher expected well-
being if, instead, a principle that prescribes A were followed. Since it
would not be in anyone’s interests were the Ex-Post Dierence Principle
followed in Case 1, the parties in the Original Position know that, in that
case, were the Ex-Post Dierence Principle followed, it would not be in
their interests. By this argument, the parties in the Original Position can
gure out (without assigning probabilities to their turning out to be any
particular person in society) that it would not be in their interests to agree
to the Ex-Post Dierence Principle.
The above argument also applies to a stricter maximin variant of the
Dierence Principle. Consider
The Strict Maximin Dierence Principle
Let the social value of a nal outcome be equal to the minimum
well-being of any person in the outcome. And let the social value
of a prospect be equal to the minimum social value of any possible
nal outcome of the prospect. Choose a prospect with a maximal
social value among all alternative prospects.
This version of the Dierence Principle yields the same result as the Ex-
Post Dierence Principle in Case 1. To see this, note that, if we choose A,
the minimum possible well-being level is 1 but, if we choose B, the mini-
mum possible well-being level is 2, which is better. So the Strict Maximin
Dierence Principle also prescribes B in Case 1. It is therefore vulnerable
to the same objection as the Ex-Post Dierence Principle.
It may be objected that theWeak Ex-Ante Pareto Principle is only plau-
sible if the parties in the Original Position are risk neutral whereas Rawls
seems to assume that the parties are risk averse. But this is neither Rawls’s
view nor a plausible view. While Rawls’s early work might suggest this
reading, he later claried that his argument makes no assumptions about
the parties being risk averse, which he agrees would make his argument
very weak.18On the contrary, Rawls rules out that the parties have any
special, non-standard attitudes to risk.19 The parties are assumed to be
rational in the standard economic sense, being risk neutral.20 Neverthe-
less, while we shall assume that the parties are risk neutral, my argument
17 An example of a principle that would have given everyone a higher expected well-
being in this case is the Principle of Average Utility. Note, however, that my argument
does not rely on this principle. The parties would, for example, compare the Ex-Post Dif-
ference Principle unfavorably with a principle that is equivalent except that it prescribes
A in Case 1.
18 Rawls, “Reply to Alexander and Musgrave,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics
lxxxviii 4 (November 1974): 633–55, at pp. 649–50, and JF, pp. xvii, 99, 110.
19 TJ (1999), p. 148. Compare with TJ (1971), p. 172.
20 JF, p. 87.
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only needs to rule out that they may have an extreme aversion to risk (see
appendix).
One could, for example, resist my argument if one held that the Max-
imin Rule for Choice under Uncertainty is a principle of rationality for
acting under both risk and uncertainty, because it would then be in Alice’s
and Bob’s interests that B is chosen in Case 1. But this is not a plausible
view. Using the Maximin Rule for Choice under Uncertainty as a way to
deal with risk and uncertainty forces us to mitigate the worst possible
outcome however unlikely, regardless of the likely costs.21 And, as Rawls
points out, this seems irrational.22
It may next be objected that Rawls seems to argue that the parties
must ignore all probabilities in the Original Position, which could favor
the Strict Maximin Dierence Principle. This, however, is a misreading
of Rawls and a misunderstanding of the Veil of Ignorance. Rawls merely
objects to the idea that the parties may assign an equal probability to their
turning out to be anyone by applying
The Principle of Insucient Reason
If there is insucient reason to regard either of two alternative
possibilities as more probable than the other, then they may be
regarded as equally probable.23
If the parties applied this principle and assigned an equal probability to
being anyone, they could see that they would maximize their expected
well-being by agreeing to
The Principle of Average Utility
Choose a prospect with a maximal average expected well-being
among all alternative prospects.24
In his discussion of this argument for the Principle of Average Utility,
Rawls does not object to the parties’ relying on probabilities that are
21 See the examples in Harsanyi, “Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for
Morality?,” op. cit., pp. 595–96.
22 Rawls, “Some Reasons for the Maximin Criterion,” op. cit., p. 142, and JF, p. 97n19.
23 The principle should be restricted to a privileged partitioning of possibilities to
block counter-examples of the kind in John Maynard Keynes, A Treatise on Probability
(New York: Macmillan, 1929), pp. 42–44. While the exact form of this restriction is
unclear, the main rival principle for choice under uncertainty faces much the same
problem: The Leximin Rule for Choice under Uncertainty is likewise sensitive to the
partitioning of possibilities into states of nature (and the Maximin Rule for Choice
under Uncertainty ignores improvements in any possible outcome except the worst);
see Salvador Barbarà and Matthew Jackson, “Maximin, Leximin, and the Protective
Criterion: Characterizations andComparisons,” Journal of Economic Theory, 46 (October
1988): 34–44, at p. 40. Barbarà and Jackson’s own proposal, the Protective Criterion,
violates the transitivity of ‘equally good as’; ibid., p. 41.
24 Harsanyi, “CardinalWelfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons
of Utility,” at p. 316.
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based on particular facts about society; he merely objects to the use of
the Principle of Insucient Reason. Rawls writes:
I shall assume, therefore, to ll out the description of the original
position, that the parties ignore estimates of likelihoods not sup-
ported by particular facts and that derive from the principle of
insucient reason.25
Put in terms of his risk/uncertainty distinction, Rawls rules out assigning
or estimating probabilities in cases of uncertainty (where there is no
objective basis for estimating probabilities) but not in cases of risk (where
there is an objective basis for estimating probabilities).26 The motivation
for this requirement is that the parties in the Original Position should
not try to estimate the very knowledge the Veil of Ignorance is supposed
to hide.27 That is why Rawls objects to the parties’ using the Principle
of Insucient Reason to estimate the probability of their turning out
to be any particular member of society. Rawls’s requirement does not
demand that the parties ignore probabilities about risky prospects with
an objective basis which society and its individuals might face aer the
Veil of Ignorance is lied. Those risks are part of what a principle of
distributive justice should cover. Unlike probabilities for turning out to
be any particular person, which are hidden to ensure impartiality, there
are no grounds for ruling out probabilities based on particular facts about
risks in society.28
25 TJ (1999), p. 149. TJ (1971), p. 173, has a somewhat dierent wording. See also TJ
(1971), p. 168, (1999), pp. 145–46.
26 JF, p. 106. Rawls describes the interpretation of rationality in the Original Position
as “taking eective means to ends with unied expectations and objective interpretation
of probability”; TJ (1971), p. 146, (1999), p. 127.
27 TJ (1971), p. 171, (1999), p. 147.
28 There is one perplexing passage that might seem to conict with this reading:
Rawls states—in TJ (1971), p. 155—that
the veil of ignorance excludes all but the vaguest knowledge of likelihoods.
The parties have no basis for determining the probable nature of their
society, or their place in it. Thus they have strong reasons for being wary
of probability calculations if any other course is open to them.
Rawls’s revision of this passage—in TJ (1999), p. 134—is even stronger, stating that
the veil of ignorance excludes all knowledge of likelihoods. The parties
have no basis for determining the probable nature of their society, or
their place in it. Thus they have no basis for probability calculations.
(See also JF, p. 98.) In this passage, it might seem that Rawls rules out all deliberation
based on probabilities and risks in the Original Position. The problem is that, if one
were to rule out all such deliberations, the parties would not be in a position to assess
the principles of distributive justice in so far as they cover the distribution of risks
in society. For example, if the parties had no knowledge of probabilities, they could
not assess whether an ex-ante approach would be preferable to an ex-post approach.
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Still, one may be unconvinced and object that, even though Rawls
does not hold this view, he should reject any probabilities in the Origi-
nal Position and favor the Strict Maximin Dierence Principle. But, in
addition to the above reasons why Rawls rejects this principle, there is a
further reason why this principle is an implausible account of justice: The
Strict Maximin Dierence Principle yields excessively anti-egalitarian
results when risks are taken jointly. Consider
Case 2
Alice Bob
101 101
1 1
2 3
99%
1%
A
B
Here, in the choice node, represented by the box, we have a choice between
two basic structures of society, A and B. If we choose A, we would reach a
chance node, represented by the circle, where the probability that chance
goes up is 99 percent—giving everyone a well-being of 101—and the prob-
ability that chance goes down is 1 percent—giving everyone a well-being
of 1. If we choose B, Alice would get a well-being of 2 whereas Bob would
get a well-being of 3. Like before, we assume that these probabilities have
an objective basis. In this case, the Strict Maximin Dierence Principle
prescribes B. Yet B has an unequal outcome, whereas the outcome of
A is perfectly equal both ex ante and ex post. The risk we would take if
we chose A would be shared by everyone equally and be to everyone’s
expected benet: A gives everyone an expected well-being of 100, whereas
B gives Alice and Bob an expected well-being of 2 and 3 respectively. To
favor the unequal prospect of B in Case 2 on the grounds of justice is to
And then, crucially for Rawls, the parties could not be in a position to agree to the
Ex-Ante Dierence Principle, because there would be no way for them to assess what
is to the greatest expected benet of the least advantaged members of society and see
the advantages of that principle over the Ex-Post Dierence Principle or even the Strict
Maximin Dierence Principle. The most plausible reading of the passage is that Rawls
stresses that the parties must deliberate under complete uncertainty about the nature of
their actual society and their place in it; so they may not assign or estimate probabilities
to what society and their place in it are actually like. But, since the parties are to agree
to general principles of distributive justice, they need to (and may) consider the possible
risks in all hypothetical choices covered by these principles for all hypothetical societies
that they could (as far as they know) be part of. Being able to reason about these
hypothetical probabilities with a hypothetical objective basis is consistent with the
parties having ‘no basis for determining the probable nature of their society’, since they
are under uncertainty regarding which one of these hypothetical societies they actually
live in. So the last sentence of the revised passage should probably be read as “Thus they
have no basis for probability calculations [about the society they actually live in].”
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confuse justice with risk aversion. Thankfully, Rawls does not hold this
view.
2. The Ex-AnteDierence Principle
As we have seen, the parties in the Original Position would reject the
Ex-Post Dierence Principle. And, as mentioned, Rawls also rejects that
principle. Rawls states that social and economic inequalities must be
to the greatest expected benet of the least advantaged members
of society (the maximin equity criterion)29
This suggests
The Ex-Ante Dierence Principle
Let the social value of a prospect be equal to theminimum expected
well-being of any person in the prospect. Choose a prospect with a
maximal social value among all alternative prospects.
This version of the Dierence Principle avoids the problematic implica-
tions of the ex-post approach in Case 1. The Ex-Ante Dierence Principle
prescribes A in Case 1, because Amaximizes the minimum expected well-
being: The minimum expected well-being level if we choose A is 3, but, if
we choose B, it is 2. Likewise, the Ex-Ante Dierence Principle avoids the
problematic implications of the Strict Maximin Dierence Principle in
Case 2. The Ex-Ante Dierence Principle prescribes A in Case 2, because
choosing Amaximizes the minimum expected well-being: The minimum
expected well-being level is 100 if we choose A, but, if we choose B, it
is 2. Hence the Ex-Ante Dierence Principle is not open to the earlier
objections to the ex-post approach.
Nevertheless, consider the following sequential case:
29 Rawls, “Some Reasons for the Maximin Criterion,” op. cit., p. 142. See also Rawls’s
rst statement of the Dierence Principle, in Rawls, “Distributive Justice,” op. cit., p. 66.
Rawls’s statement in TJ (1971), p. 83, le out ‘expected’, but his revised statement in
TJ (1999), p. 72, includes it. Yet—in both TJ (1971), p. 92, and TJ (1999), p. 79—Rawls
clearly favors an ex-ante approach, stating that the comparisons for the application of
the Dierence Principle “are made in terms of expectations of primary social goods.” In
JF, pp. 42–43, Rawls also leaves out ‘expected’ in the statement of the Dierence Principle,
but he claries (JF, p. 59) that “the inequalities to which the dierence principle applies
are dierence in citizens’ (reasonable) expectations of primary goods over a complete
life.” In Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia, 1993), p. 6, (hereinaer referred
to as PL) Rawls rst states the principle without ‘expected’ but later (PL, p. 271) with
‘expected’. This strongly suggests that the principle should be read with an implicit
‘expected’ even when Rawls, for some unknown reason, leaves it out.
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Case 3
Alice Bob
9 1
3 3
1 9
3 3
4 4
1/2
1/2
A
B
A
B
A
B
1
2
3
In this case, there are three choice nodes, represented by the numbered
boxes. And there is a chance node, represented by the circle, where there is
a one-in-two probability that chance goes up and a one-in-two probability
that chance goes down. Like before, we assume that these probabilities
have an objective basis. Choice node 1 is a rst choice between two basic
structures A and B. Choice nodes 2 and 3 are later opportunities to revise
the rst choice. In each choice node, A is chosen by going up and B is
chosen by going down.
The plan to adopt and stick to A in choice node 1 has a minimum
expected well-being of 5, since for both Alice and Bob that plan would
amount to a y-y gamble between getting a well-being of 1 or 9 (giving
them both an expected well-being of 5). The plan to adopt and stick to B
in choice node 1 has a minimum expected well-being of 4, since it would
give each of Alice and Bob a well-being of 4. So, assessing these basic
structures with the Ex-AnteDierence Principle in choice node 1, it seems
that we should choose A, since it maximizes the minimum expected well-
being. Choosing A requires that we go up in choice node 1. And, if we
were to go up in choice node 1, then, depending on chance, we would
face either choice node 2 or choice node 3.
Suppose we face one of choice nodes 2 and 3. These choice nodes also
oer a choice between basic structures, as they oer an opportunity to
revise the earlier choice between A and B. So we should consult the Ex-
AnteDierence Principle again. In choice nodes 2 and 3,Ahas aminimum
expected well-being of 1, since it gives one of Alice and Bob a well-being
of 9 and the other a well-being of 1. And B has a minimum expected well-
being of 3, since it gives each of Alice and Bob a well-being of 3. Assessing
these basic structures with the Ex-Ante Dierence Principle in choice
nodes 2 and 3, we should choose B rather than A, since B maximizes the
minimum expected well-being.
So, by continuously applying the Ex-Ante Dierence Principle in
Case 3, we would rst choose A in choice node 1 and then, in one of
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choice nodes 2 and 3, we would revise the basic structure of society to B,
giving everyone a well-being of 3. This would clearly be wrong, however:
It makes everyone worse o than if B had been chosen directly in choice
node 1, which would have given everyone a well-being of 4.
At this point, it may be objected that the problem here is not the
Ex-Ante Dierence Principle but only this myopic application of that
principle—that is, applying it without taking into account what it would
prescribe in future choice nodes. So let us combine the Ex-AnteDierence
Principle with backward induction, which is to rst consider what would
be chosen in later choice nodes and then take the predicted choices into
account when we consider earlier choices. As we have seen, the Ex-Ante
Dierence Principle prescribes B in choice nodes 2 and 3. Taking this
into account at choice node 1, choosing A gives each of Alice and Bob
an expected well-being of 3, but choosing B gives each of Alice and Bob
an expected well-being of 4. So the Ex-Ante Dierence Principle applied
with backward induction prescribes B in choice node 1.
Thus, in Case 3, the Ex-Ante Dierence Principle results in either
everyone getting a well-being of 3 (applied myopically) or everyone get-
ting a well-being of 4 (applied with backward induction). Either way,
the Ex-Ante Dierence Principle does worse in Case 3 than a principle
that prescribes choosing and sticking to A, that is, to follow the plan of
choosing A in all three choice nodes. Choosing and sticking to A gives
each of Alice and Bob an expected well-being of 5, since it would amount
to a y-y gamble for each between getting a well-being of 1 or 9. So
following the Ex-Ante Dierence Principle in Case 3 gives everyone an
expected well-being of either 3 or 4, but following an alternative principle
that prescribes choosing and sticking to A gives everyone an expected
well-being of 5.30
Hence, in Case 3, the Ex-Post Dierence Principle violates
The Weak Sequential Ex-Ante Pareto Principle
If each person has a higher expected well-being in prospect x than
in prospect y, then a plan whose expected outcome is y is not
followed if there is an alternative plan whose expected outcome
is x.
This violation illustrates that it would not be in anyone’s rational interests
that the Ex-AnteDierence Principle were followed in Case 3.31 The point
30An example of a principle that would prescribe choosing and sticking to A in Case 3
is the Principle of Average Utility.
31 At least, it would not be in anyone’s long-term lifetime interest, which is what
matters according to Rawls, TJ (1971), p. 64, (1999), p. 56, and JF, p. 59. This focus
on lifetime well-being is what blocks the sequential argument against the Dierence
Principle in D. W. Haslett, “Does the Dierence Principle Really Favour the Worst O?,”
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of the Ex-Ante Dierence Principle is to arrange the basic structure of
society to the expected benet of the least advantaged. But, as we have
seen in sequential cases, this principle can lower the expectations of the
least advantaged. As Rawls writes,
a principle is ruled out if it would be self-contradictory, or self-
defeating, for everyone to act upon it. [. . .] Principles are to be
chosen in view of the consequences of everyone’s complying with
them.32
The parties in the Original Position would not agree to the Ex-Ante
Dierence Principle, since in Case 3 they know that—no matter who they
are in society—it would not be in their interest to adopt that principle.
By this argument, the parties in the Original Position are led to reject
the Ex-Ante Dierence Principle without being able to assign or estimate
probabilities to their turning out to be any particular member of society.
It may be objected that the basic structure of society only needs to be
chosen once.33 And, if so, there would not be any need to revise the basic
structure at choice nodes 2 and 3. So one could apply the Ex-Ante Dier-
ence Principle myopically in choice node 1, choose A, and then simply
keep that structure. The problem with this move is that the justication
for A in choice node 1 is that A is prescribed by the Ex-Ante Dierence
Principle, but this justication no longer applies in choice nodes 2 and 3,
since, in those nodes, the Ex-Ante Dierence Principle prescribes B.34
Mind xciv 373 (January 1985): 111–15, at pp. 111–12.
32 TJ (1971), p. 132, (1999), p. 114.
33 I thank Krister Bykvist for raising this objection. Rawls, however, maintains that
the basic structure would need adjustments even in a well-ordered society. See Rawls,
“The Basic Structure as Subject,” American Philosophical Quarterly, xiv 2 (April 1977):
159–65, at p. 164, and PL, p. 284.
34 Note moreover that, although the initial choice of basic structure in Case 3 helps
the presentation, it is inessential to the argument. To see this, consider the following
variation without the rst choice node:
Case 3*
Alice Bob
9 1
3 3
1 9
3 3
1/2
1/2
A
B
A
B
2
3
In this variation, we have that, calculated from the initial chance node, following the
Ex-Ante Dierence Principle in the choice nodes gives everyone an expected well-being
of 3, whereas following a principle that prescribes A in these choice nodes (such as the
Principle of Average Utility) gives everyone an expected well-being of 5. In this variation,
the basic structure of society is only chosen once. Yet the parties can still see that it is
not in their individual interests to agree to the Ex-Ante Dierence Principle.
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There is, however, a variation of the Ex-Ante Dierence Principle
which ensures that the minimum expected well-being would be maxi-
mized consistently relative to a privileged node (or point in time). This
variation focuses at all times on the plans that were available in the priv-
ileged node. Here, a plan that is available in the privileged node is a
specication of what to choose in each choice node that can be reached
from the privileged node. Consider
The Resolute Ex-Ante Dierence Principle
Let the social value of a plan be equal to theminimumexpectedwell-
being of any person if the plan were followed, with expectations
calculated from a certain privileged initial node. Choose a prospect
following a plan with maximal social value among the plans that
(i) were available in the privileged node and (ii) are still feasible.35
The Resolute Ex-Ante Dierence Principle demands that one follow a
plan that maximizes the minimum expected well-being relative to the
privileged node. In Case 3, if we let choice node 1 be the privileged node,
the alternative plans in that node will be valued by minimum expected
well-being as follows:
• A in choice node 1; A in choice node 2; A in choice node 3
Minimum expected well-being: 5
• A in choice node 1; A in choice node 2; B in choice node 3
Minimum expected well-being: 2
• A in choice node 1; B in choice node 2; A in choice node 3
Minimum expected well-being: 2
• A in choice node 1; B in choice node 2; B in choice node 3
Minimum expected well-being: 3
• B in choice node 1
Minimum expected well-being: 4
So, if choice node 1 is the privileged node, the Resolute Ex-AnteDierence
Principle prescribes that one follow the rst plan of choosing A in all
three choice nodes. If one sticks to the rst plan, as the Resolute Ex-Ante
Dierence Principle prescribes, one avoids choosing so that everyone
gets a worse expected well-being in choice node 1 than they could have
had if one had followed an alternative plan. Note, however, that sticking
to the rst plan involves not beneting the least advantaged in one of
choice nodes 2 and 3.
35 The resolute approach is based on McClennen’s resolute-choice decision theory.
See Edward F. McClennen, Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations
(New York: Cambridge), p. 13.
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Yet the main problem with the Resolute Ex-Ante Dierence Principle
is its need for a privileged node or time. In choice node 2 (or 3), if that node
were the privileged node, the Resolute Ex-AnteDierence Principle would
prescribe B. Yet, as we saw earlier, if choice node 1 were the privileged
node, then the Resolute Ex-Ante Dierence Principle would prescribe A
in choice node 2 (or 3). The problem is that no time could plausibly serve
as a non-arbitrary privileged time in the Original Position.
One suggestion for a privileged time could be the start or founding
of society. But, rst, there is typically no exact point in time at which a
society is founded, and it seems to some extent arbitrary how societies
should be individuated over time. Hence any specic, exact time for the
founding of society would be arbitrary. Second, it seems that the time of
the founding of society would only be signicant to the parties if they
had some reason to think that they entered the Original Position at that
time. Aer the founding of society (in particular for later generations),
the parties have no reason to attach any signicance to expectations
calculated relative to the time of the founding. Their concern, trying to
advance their individual interests, would be their potential expectations
aer the veil is lied—that is, their expectations relative to the time they
entered, or will exit, the Original Position.
Another suggestion is to have a separate Original Position for each
new generation, each generation choosing its own separate privileged
node for the Resolute Ex-AnteDierence Principle. Generations, however,
are continuous: there is no non-arbitrary time at which a new generation
starts. Moreover, generations overlap; so the Resolute Ex-Ante Dierence
Principle needs to cover distributions between contemporary yet dierent
generations. And, with dierent privileged nodes, we could get incompat-
ible prescriptions. Consider, for example, Case 3: Suppose that Alice and
Bob belong to two separate yet overlapping generations and that one gen-
eration enters the Original Position at the time of choice node 1 and the
other enters at the time of choice node 2 (or 3). Given that choice node 1 is
the privileged node, the Resolute Ex-Ante Dierence Principle prescribes
A in choice node 2. But, given that choice node 2 is the privileged node,
the Resolute Ex-Ante Dierence Principle disallows A in choice node 2.
Amore general problem is that any time-sensitivemanner of picking a
privileged node would require time-sensitive information in the Original
Position. This conicts with Rawls’s specication that
the original positionmust be interpreted so that one can at any time
adopt its perspective. It must make no dierence when one takes
up this viewpoint, or who does so: the restrictions must be such
that the same principles are always chosen. The veil of ignorance
is a key condition in meeting this requirement. It insures not only
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that the information available is relevant, but that it is at all times
the same.36
If principles of justice are justied via the Original Position, it seems that
the principles that are justied at a time are those principles that would be
agreed to in the Original Position if it were (hypothetically) entered at that
time.37 But, if the choice of these principles were based on time-sensitive
information, dierent principles would be chosen (and thus justied) at
dierent times. While the basic structure of society may plausibly need
revision from time to time, it is implausible that the underlying principles
of justice would change.38 If the parties knew the time of their entry
into the Original Position and picked the privileged point based on that
information, their choice would be time sensitive contrary to Rawls’s
specication. But, if they do not know the time of their entry into the
Original Position, there seems to be no non-arbitrary time they could be
in a position to pick as the privileged one. Hence, like the other versions
of the Dierence Principle, the Resolute Ex-Ante Dierence Principle
would not be chosen by the parties in the Original Position.
3. Conclusion
As we have seen, there are several versions of the Dierence Principle, and
they are open to very dierent problems. Nomatter which version we pick,
however, we have seen that we would face one of two problems. Either
it would not be in the interests of the parties in the Original Position to
adopt the Dierence Principle in at least one of Cases 1, 2, and 3, or the
principle would need to refer to a privileged time, which would exclude
it from the discussions behind the Veil of Ignorance. Hence the parties in
the Original Position would not agree to the Dierence Principle.
Appendix
For simplicity, I have assumed that the value of expectations are calculated
according to expected utility theory. This may have raised some worries
36 TJ (1999), p. 120. The wording in TJ (1971), p. 139, is slightly dierent.
37 TJ (1971), pp. 19–21, (1999), pp. 17–19; Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political Not
Metaphysical,” Philosophy and Public Aairs xiv 3 (Summer 1985): 223–51, at pp. 237–39;
Rawls, “The Basic Structure as Subject,” in Alvin I. Goldman and Jaegwon Kim, eds.,
Values and Morals: Essays in Honor of William Frankena, Charles Stevenson, and Richard
Brandt, (Boston: Reidel, 1978), pp. 47–71, at p. 59; and PL, pp. 274–75.
38 Rawls claims that “rst principles must be capable of serving as a public charter of
a well-ordered society in perpetuity”; TJ (1971), p. 131, (1999), pp. 113–14. Having separate
versions of the Resolute Ex-Ante Dierence Principle for dierent generations seems to
violate this requirement.
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about risk aversion and diminishing marginal value of well-being if well-
being levels represent indexes of primary goods.
But all that is needed formy discussion of Cases 1 and 3 is that there are
three levels a, b, and c such that a is better than b, b is better than c, and a
gamble with a one-in-two probability of a and a one-in-two probability of
c is a better expectation than b with certainty. This assumption does not
conict with diminishing marginal values. To see this, consider monetary
expectations. Even though $2,000 is not twice as good as $1,000, it is still
very plausible that a gamble with a one-in-two probability of $2,000 and
a one-in-two probability of $1,000 is a better expectation than $1,001 with
certainty. This is plausible because the dierence in value between getting
$2,000 and getting $1,001 (that is, the potential gain from the gamble) is
still much larger than the dierence in value between getting $1,001 and
getting $1,000 (that is, the equally likely potential loss).
So we only need three levels a, b, and c such that a is better than b, b is
better than c, and the dierence in value between getting a and getting b
is much larger than the dierence in value between getting b and getting c.
This requirement can be met even if a is only a little bit better than c,
because we can pick a level b such that b is only better than c by an
arbitrarily small amount. Then, in Case 1, we could replace level 5 with a,
level 2 with b, and level 1 with c. And, in Case 3, we could replace level 9
with a, level 4 with b, level 1 with c, and level 3 with any level that is worse
than b but better than c. Given this change, my arguments are compatible
with non-extreme forms of risk aversion.
Likewise, all that is needed for my discussion of Case 2 is that there are
three levels a, b, and c such that a is better than b, b is better than c, and
a gamble with a 99 percent probability of a and a 1 percent probability of
c is a better expectation than b with certainty. The only dierence to the
assumption for the other cases is that the better outcome in the gamble is
more probable. Hence the plausibility of this assumption follows by the
same kind of argument as before. So, in Case 2, we could replace level 101
with a, level 3 with b, level 1 with c, and level 2 with any level that is worse
than b but better than c.
